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I. INTRODUCTION
“It is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what the law is. Those who apply the rule to particular
cases, must of necessity expound and interpret that rule.”1 This unwavering maxim written over 200 years ago by Justice John Marshall continues to resonate in federal courtrooms today. Yet, judges
often face difficulties when attempting to heed Marshall’s words, especially when tasked with interpreting an ambiguous statute. Furthermore, disagreement over what device the court should grab out of
its interpretive toolbox to provide clarity may impede a judge’s ability
to effectively “say what the law is.”2 One common interpretive practice looks to traditional legislative history,3 including committee re-


* J.D. Florida State University, College of Law, 2011; B.S. Finance, Florida State
University, College of Business, 2008. The author wishes to thank Professor Tara Grove
and Brett Dennis for their helpful comments and guidance on earlier drafts, Professor JoLen Wolf for her continuing guidance, and the author’s family for their constant support
and encouragement.
1. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).
2. Id.
3. See, e.g., Holy Trinity Church v. United States, 143 U.S. 457 (1892). In Holy
Trinity Church, the court looked beyond the plain meaning of the text and consulted both
the House and Senate Committee Reports when interpreting the Alien Contract Labor
Laws of 1885. Id. at 464-65; see also Note, Why Learned Hand Would Never Consult
Legislative History Today, 105 HARV. L. REV. 1005, 1010 (1992) [hereinafter Note, Learned
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ports, sponsor statements, and floor debates. Others seek to clarify
ambiguities with dictionary definitions.4 However, under recent administrations, a new tool has found its way into the judiciary’s assortment of interpretive aides—presidential signing statements.
Presidents continue to issue more signing statements each year, often times asserting their own interpretation of a statute.5 Utilization
of this executive tool presents the question: should these statements
be characterized as a new form of legislative history on which federal
courts should rely when engaging in statutory construction?
While signing a bill into enactment, the President will often issue
what is termed a signing statement—a written, official pronouncement relating to the legislation.6 Though these statements have various applications, they have predominately served four specific functions.7 The pronouncements may explain the President’s understanding as to the effects of a bill’s adoption, advise members of the Executive Branch of how to interpret or administer a bill, and state whether the President thinks certain provisions of a bill, if applied, might
violate the Constitution.8 However, this Note focuses on the use of
signing statements that “create legislative history to which the courts
are expected to give some weight when construing the enactment,” a
function considered exceedingly controversial.9
Part of the controversy stems from the absence of a definitive answer on how interpreting courts should treat presidential signing
statements. Courts have not ultimately decided whether signing
statements should be treated as an authoritative source of legislative
history.10 Furthermore, judicial reliance on signing statements has
been “sporadic and unpredictable.”11 Scholarly debate also reflects a
sense of unpredictability, as opinions concerning the statements’ appropriate place in statutory construction vary drastically. Some scholars argue that these statements hold no interpretive weight and


Hand ] (stating that Holy Trinity Church “marked the beginning of an accelerating shift
toward the use of legislative history”).
4. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
228 (2000).
5. See infra Part II.
6. T.J. HALSTEAD, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS:
CONSTITUTIONAL
AND
INSTITUTIONAL
IMPLICATIONS
1
(2007),
http://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/natsec/RL33667.pdf.
7. Kristy L. Carroll, Comment, Whose Statute is it Anyway?: Why and How Courts
Should Use Presidential Signing Statements When Interpreting Federal Statutes, 46 CATH.
U. L. REV. 475, 488-90 (1997).
8. The Legal Significance of Presidential Signing Statements, 17 Op. Off. Legal
Counsel 131, 131 (1993) [hereinafter Legal Significance]. Discussion of these particular
uses of signing statements is beyond the scope of this Note.
9. Id.
10. Note, Context-Sensitive Deference to Presidential Signing Statements, 120 HARV. L.
REV. 597, 600 (2006) [hereinafter Note, Context-Sensitive Deference].
11. S. 3731, 109th Cong. § 2(6) (2006).
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should not be defined as legislative history,12 while some claim they
should at least be considered “species of statutory interpretation,”
but should not be included among traditional legislative sources.13
Others contend that the statements are more comparable to “executive implementation of a statute”; therefore, they should be provided
the same level of deference courts typically assign agency interpretations.14 To further complicate the matter, Presidents have not formally declared how much weight an interpreting court should give their
statements.
Evidence of the judiciary’s conflicting opinions was recently showcased in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,15 a 2006 case presented to the United
States Supreme Court. The Court was asked to determine whether
the Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, which truncated the ability of
Guantánamo Bay detainees to bring lawsuits,16 applied retroactively
to cases currently pending or whether it was only applicable to lawsuits filed after the legislation was enacted.17 The majority opinion,
relying on legislative history, reached the conclusion that the Act only applied to future lawsuits and not those currently pending.18 In
dissent, Justice Scalia, joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, condemned the majority’s reliance on legislative history.19 While Scalia
noted the Court should not have deferred to legislative history because the language of the Act was “unambiguous,” he nevertheless
criticized the Court for ignoring President Bush’s signing statement
which “explicitly set forth his understanding that the DTA [Detainee
Treatment Act] ousted jurisdiction over pending cases.”20 While this
case demonstrates the Court’s awareness of the debate, the division
among the Court regarding the proper treatment of presidential signing statements in statutory interpretation only affirms that the issue
remains unresolved.


12. See, e.g., Marc N. Garber & Kurt A. Wimmer, Presidential Signing Statements as
Interpretations of Legislative Intent: An Executive Aggrandizement of Power, 24 HARV. J. ON
LEGIS. 363, 363 (1987).
13. Note, Context-Sensitive Deference, supra note 10, at 598.
14. Id. at 608. The standard of deference for agency interpretations is stated in
Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). In Skidmore, the Court looked to the
Administrator’s opinions when interpreting the Fair Labor Standards Act and determined
the weight of such opinions “will depend upon the thoroughness evident in its
consideration, the validity of its reasoning, its consistency with earlier and later
pronouncements, and all those factors which give it power to persuade, if lacking power to
control.” Id. at 140.
15. 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
16. Detainee Treatment Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-148, § 1005(e)(1), 119 Stat. 2739,
2742 (2005).
17. Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 574.
18. Id. at 576-84.
19. Id. at 665 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
20. Id. at 665-66.
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This Note attempts to provide a solution. Although signing statements are not without their problems, courts should not completely
discount them when interpreting federal statutes. This Note argues
instead that presidential signing statements should be added to
courts’ interpretive toolbox as a new form of legislative history. However, because of the potential pitfalls, judicial reliance should be constrained. Thus, this Note contends that the statements are not dispositive and should be given minimal interpretive weight as a component in the overall context that judges consider. Deference should
also be conditioned on two factors: (1) evidence that the President
and Executive Branch were involved in drafting the legislation under
judicial scrutiny and (2) that the statement should serve only as collateral support to a conclusion the court reaches with other interpretive tools. To provide some context to the debate, Part II of this Note
includes a brief analysis of the historical background surrounding
presidential signing statements. Next, Part III discusses the types of
legislative history traditionally consulted by courts. While there is
significant debate over the legitimacy of legislative history, the foundation of this Note rests on the assumption that it can provide helpful insight to an interpreting court. Based on a comparative analysis
between presidential signing statements and legislative history, this
Note concludes that signing statements are similar to nonlegislator
statements and subsequent legislative history and should be treated
as such by courts for interpretive purposes. Part IV expands upon
this comparative analysis by examining the practical and institutional implications that would result if signing statements were provided
the proposed level of deference.
II. A HISTORICAL LOOK AT THE USE OF PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS
A. The Early Years
Early forms of presidential signing statements were predominately “ceremonial.”21 The President generally issued the pronouncements to congratulate Congress for the passage of a new bill22
or to express “appreciation to those who have provided support
through the legislative process.”23 Yet, in the nineteenth century, the
Monroe Administration issued statements that were more than ceremonial; namely, they described the President’s personal insights on
legislation.24 In regards to a bill that dictated the method for se-


21. Carroll, supra note 7, at 476.
22. Id.; see also Garber & Wimmer, supra note 12, at 363.
23. PHILLIP J. COOPER, BY ORDER OF THE PRESIDENT: THE USE AND ABUSE OF
EXECUTIVE DIRECT ACTION 213 (2002).
24. ABA TASK FORCE ON PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS AND THE SEPARATION OF
POWERS
DOCTRINE,
RECOMMENDATION
7
(2006),
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lecting military officers, President Monroe attached a statement declaring “the President, not Congress, bore the constitutional responsibility for appointing military officers.”25
Presidents Andrew Jackson and John Tyler also composed statements that did more than just praise congressional efforts.ʹ However, these early statements were accompanied by early forms of criticism. In 1830, President Jackson issued a statement expressing his
understanding that a road authorized by an appropriations bill was
to be limited to the territory of Michigan.27 Shortly thereafter, the
House issued a report stating that Jackson’s declaration amounted to
a line-item veto.28 Similarly, President Tyler issued a statement in
1840 disagreeing with certain provisions in a bill that apportioned
congressional districts.29 John Quincy Adams, a spokesman for the
House of Representatives at the time, questioned the very issuance of
the document and “advised that the signing statement should ‘be regarded in no other light than a defacement of the public records and
archives.’ ”30 Despite the criticism, Presidents continued to issue
statements that asserted their opinions of newly enacted legislation,31 and by the 1950s, signing statements became a common presidential tool.32
B. The Reagan Administration: Establishing the Legitimacy of
Presidential Signing Statements
Before Ronald Reagan took office in 1981, it is estimated that only
ten signing statements included presidential interpretations of federal statutes.33 While previous Presidents began to expand this largely
ceremonial practice, the Reagan Administration solidified it as a political one. Fueled by media opposition towards the Executive
Branch, as well as the “skepticism and even open hostility from”


http://www.abanet.org/op/signingstatements/aba_final_signing_statements_recommendatio
n-report_7-24-06.pdf [hereinafter ABA TASK FORCE REPORT] (discussing a statement issued
by Monroe that was not congratulatory but, instead, stated his opinion on how a specific
law was to be enforced).
25. Id.
26. See Frank B. Cross, The Constitutional Legitimacy and Significance of
Presidential “Signing Statements”, 40 ADMIN. L. REV. 209, 210 (1988).
27. Id.
28. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 2.
29. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 7.
30. Id. (quoting Christopher S. Kelley, A Comparative Look at the Constitutional
Signing Statement: The Case of Bush and Clinton 5 (April 2003) (presented at the 61st
Annual Meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association)).
31. See, e.g., Legal Significance, supra note 8, at 139-41 (discussing the use of signing
statements by various Presidents including President Johnson through President Carter).
32. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 2.
33. See William D. Popkin, Judicial Use of Presidential Legislative History: A
Critique, 66 IND. L.J. 699, 702 (1991).
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Congress,34 President Reagan and his administration envisioned the
statements as a means of asserting executive power in the face of a
“post-Watergate Congress they viewed as having grown too powerful.”35
With this sort of political maneuvering in mind, President Reagan
sought to characterize presidential signing statements as legislative
history so they would be used by courts as a legitimate, interpretive
device. The idea was first presented to Edwin Meese, the Attorney
General at the time, by two young attorneys, Steven Calabresi and
John Harrison.36 Calabresi and Harrison composed a memorandum
to Meese maintaining that statements attached to legislation which
offer the President’s interpretation of unclear statutes could increase
the President’s influence over the law.37 Concerned with reinstating
political authority to the Executive Branch, Meese applauded the
proposition and wrote to West Publishing Company requesting that
the President’s statements be included with traditional legislative
history in the United States Code Congressional and Administrative
News.38 Further support for legitimizing signing statements also came
from the future Supreme Court Justice Samuel A. Alito. Alito, a member of the Litigation Strategy Working Group at the time, wrote a
memorandum suggesting a plan to implement presidential statements
as interpretive aides,39 noting that “signing statements [should] assume their rightful place in the interpretation of legislation.”40
The aggressive measures employed by the Reagan Administration
seemed to have led to the desired result. During his time in office,
President Reagan issued approximately 250 statements,41 some of
which explicitly stated his understanding of a statute’s meaning. For
example, when signing the Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1987,
President Reagan attached a statement explaining his understanding
that the bill did not apply retroactively.42 Furthermore, the Executive Branch started to gain influence over the law as courts began to
give some legal effect to signing statements.43 In the 1986 case Bowsher v. Synar, the Court cited to a presidential signing statement ex-


34. See COOPER, supra note 23, at 202.
35. Sofia E. Biller, Flooded by the Lowest Ebb: Congressional Responses to
Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Hostility to the Operation of Checks and
Balances, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1067, 1069 (2008).
36. CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY 232 (2007).
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 233.
40. Memorandum from Samuel A. Alito, Jr., Deputy Assistant Att’y Gen., Office of
Legal Counsel 1 (Feb. 5, 1986), http://www.archives.gov/news/samuel-alito/accession-06089-269/Acc060-89-269-box6-SG-LSWG-AlitotoLSWG-Feb1986.pdf.
41. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 3.
42. Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 100-71, 23 WEEKLY COMP. PRES.
DOC. 800 (July 11, 1987).
43. Id.
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pressing the President’s view concerning the act under scrutiny.44
However, courts rarely relied on the statements in an authoritative
manner.45 And, as can be expected, the increased use of signing
statements during this time sparked debate concerning the appropriate application of signing statements.46
C. Modern Use and Critiques of Presidential Signing Statements
Although the Reagan Administration ended in 1989, the expansive use of presidential signing statements did not. President Reagan’s successor, George H.W. Bush, issued 228 statements.47 President Bush, like his predecessor, attempted to protect executive power
but did so with a more “hostile tone.”48 President Clinton also followed suit and issued 381 signing statements.49 However, one scholar
argues that President Clinton’s statements represented more of a dialogue between the Executive Branch and Congress.50 While the
amount of statements issued after the Reagan Administration steadily
increased without inciting much criticism, use of the statements by
George W. Bush prompted much trepidation over the practice.
Challenging almost 1,200 separate provisions of legislation,51
George W. Bush has been critiqued as making the “most aggressive
use of the device.”52 Such aggression was fueled by an ideal the Bush
Administration referred to as the unitary executive.53 President Bush
attempted to protect the executive power, yet on a much more extreme level than the presidents that came before him. Particularly,
Bush’s signing statements often contained boilerplate language requiring the Executive Branch to construe provisions “in a manner
consistent with the President’s constitutional authority to supervise
the unitary [E]xecutive [B]ranch and to withhold information that


44. Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 719 n.1 (1986).
45. See, e.g., HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 4.
46. See generally Brad Waites, Note, Let Me Tell You What You Mean: An Analysis of
Presidential Signing Statements, 21 GA. L. REV. 755, 774-75 (1987) (discussing the Justice
Department’s and Reagan’s publication of signing statements as creating the possibility of
the Executive Branch exerting undue influence over the judiciary); Garber & Wimmer,
supra note 12, at 363 (arguing that judicial reliance on presidential signing statements
“would violate the Constitution’s separation of powers doctrine”).
47. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 5.
48. Biller, supra note 35, at 1082.
49. HALSTEAD, supra note 6, at 6.
50. Biller, supra note 35, at 1084-85.
51. Charlie Savage, Obama’s Embrace of Bush Tactic Criticized by Lawmakers From
Both Parties, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 9, 2009, at A16. Most of President Bush’s signing
statements noted that certain provisions of the proposed legislation were unconstitutional
and would not be enforced by the executive branch. Thus, a majority of his signing
statements did not attempt to offer interpretive insight of federal statutes. SAVAGE, supra
note 36, at 237.
52. SAVAGE, supra note 36, at 230.
53. Statement Accompanying Signing of H.R. 4548, 40 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOCS.
3012 (Dec. 23, 2004).
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could impair foreign relations, national security, the deliberative
processes of the Executive, or the performance of the Executive’s
constitutional duties.”54
The sheer volume of challenges Bush made to legislation generated numerous attacks against presidential signing statements. First,
the American Bar Association instructed a task force to investigate
the use of these pronouncements.55 While the report stated it was not
a direct attack against President Bush,56 the contents and critiques
contained therein seemed to indicate otherwise. Ultimately, the task
force did not address whether the statements carry interpretive
weight but did recommend opposing any signing statements that refused to enforce all or parts of a law.57 Additionally, Bush’s alleged
abuse led to the proposal of the Presidential Signing Statements Act
of 2006.58 Introduced by Senator Arlen Specter, this bill sought to
prohibit judges from relying on presidential signing statements when
interpreting federal statutes.59 However, this bill has not been
enacted, and because of a desire to protect executive power, it is unlikely any President would sign such legislation into law. Lastly,
President Bush’s use of signing statements was considered so egregious the United States Senate Committee on the Judiciary held a
hearing on the matter.60 The hearing involved testimony from several
scholars on a variety of topics. Some offered opinions on the constitutionality of signing statements, while others discussed their role in
statutory interpretation.61
Aware of the heavy criticism against his predecessor, President
Barack Obama vowed to take a more modest approach.62 However,


54. Id.; see also Statement Accompanying Signing of Pub. L. No. 107-296, 38 WEEKLY
COMP. PRES. DOCS. 2092-93 (Nov. 25, 2002).
55. ABA TASK FORCE REPORT, supra note 24, at 3.
56. Id. at 5.
57. Id.
58. See S. 3731, 109th Cong. (2006).
59. Id. § 4. A year later, Representative Carol Shea-Porter presented an almost
identical bill to the House of Representatives called the Presidential Signing Statements
Act of 2007. H.R. 3045, 110th Cong. (2007).
60. See The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Ranking Member, S.
Comm.
on
the
Judiciary),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1969&wit_id=2629.
61. See generally The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S.
Comm.
on
the
Judiciary,
109th
Cong.
(2006),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/hearing.cfm?id=1969.
62. Savage, supra note 51. President Obama even issued a memorandum on
presidential signing statements discussing the criticism the statements previously
received. Obama noted that the statements represent “the President’s constitutional
obligation to take care that the laws be faithfully executed” and promised to take careful
steps when issuing the statements. Memorandum on Presidential Signing Statements:
Memorandum for the Heads of Executive Departments and Agencies, 74 Fed. Reg. 10669
(Mar. 9, 2009), http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2009-03-11/pdf/E9-5442.pdf.
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because Obama has already challenged “dozens of provisions of bills”
through the use of signing statements,63 some critics have expressed
fear that he is following in Bush’s steps. President Obama has received several letters from State Representatives expressing their
disappointment with his “willingness” to issue the statements as
many “hoped he would roll back the practice, not entrench it.”64 At
this time, it is difficult to determine the ultimate path President Obama will take. But, as seen with past Presidents, even minimal use of
the statements is likely to prompt maximum criticism.
Despite the plethora of signing statements issued by past Presidents, few actually contained interpretive declarations.65 Further,
federal courts have rarely turned to the statements for interpretive
guidance. In 2007, a search conducted by the United States Government Accountability Office discovered that less than 140 federal cases since 1945 cited to presidential signing statements.66 Moreover,
when courts do cite to signing statements it is normally to decide issues like the date the President signed the legislation or to explain
the statute’s purpose.67 Although the Reagan Administration tried to
legitimize signing statements, courts have been reluctant to use the
statements as interpretive aides. But courts do not always need to be
apprehensive. Instead, judges should heed President Reagan’s efforts
because, as explored in the next part of this Note, signing statements
can provide helpful insight to statutory interpretation.
III. A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING
STATEMENTS AND TRADITIONAL LEGISLATIVE HISTORY
The increasing prevalence of presidential signing statements requires courts to determine their appropriate place in statutory interpretation. First, courts must decide whether or not signing statements should be classified as a new form of legislative history. To answer this question, Part III compares traditional legislative history to
presidential signing statements. Second, if signing statements possess qualities similar to legislative materials, how much deference
should courts apply to the statements in matters of statutory con-


63. Savage, supra note 51.
64. Id.
65. Curtis Bradley and Eric Posner compiled a chart of the signing statements issued
by President Carter through President George W. Bush. Curtis A. Bradley & Eric A.
Posner, Presidential Signing Statements and Executive Power, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 307
(2006). In this chart, they divide the amount of signing statements issued into rhetorical,
constitutional, and legislative history. Id. at 323. According to their research, the average
amount of legislative history signing statements issued per year is generally five or fewer.
See id.
66. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, PRESIDENTIAL SIGNING STATEMENTS
ACCOMPANYING THE FISCAL YEAR 2006 APPROPRIATIONS ACT 11 (2007),
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/appro/308603.pdf.
67. See id.
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struction? Once more, by turning to the traditional sources of legislative history that courts have relied on for years, this Note attempts to
establish a unified standard of judicial deference.
A. Traditional Legislative History
1. The Courts’ Original Interpretive Toolbox
A longstanding witticism states that “examination of statutory
text is permissible only when legislative history is ambiguous.”68 Although intended as a joke, this saying alludes to the realities of judicial practice as courts frequently use legislative history to clarify ambiguous statutes. Regarded as the “record of deliberations” pertaining
to a law’s enactment,69 legislative history represents the compromise
reached between the House and the Senate when considering proposed legislation. These sources typically include committee reports,
committee hearings, sponsor statements, floor debates, and conference reports.70
During the latter half of the twentieth century, judicial reliance on
legislative history increased substantially. One scholar observed that
“[t]he increased availability and accessibility of congressional documents . . . contributed to growth in citations to legislative history.”71
Yet, an ongoing debate over the proper interpretive function the
sources serve has persisted within court opinions and law review articles for years.72 Those in favor of using legislative history claim that
it allows the judiciary to discern legislative intent.73 Justice Breyer
believes legislative materials are particularly useful for many
functions like:
(1) avoiding an absurd result; (2) preventing the law from turning
on a drafting error; (3) understanding the meaning of specialized
terms; (4) understanding the “reasonable purpose” a provision


68. George A. Costello, Average Voting Members and Other “Benign Fictions”: The
Relative Reliability of Committee Reports, Floor Debates, and Other Sources of Legislative
History, 1990 DUKE L.J. 39, 39 (1990).
69. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4.
70. Id.
71. Michael H. Koby, The Supreme Court’s Declining Reliance on Legislative History:
The Impact of Justice Scalia’s Critique, 36 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 369, 372 (1999).
72. The debate concerning the legitimacy of legislative history is quite extensive.
While this Note offers a glimpse into some common arguments, the full debate is beyond
the scope of this Note.
73. See William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as
Practical Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321, 327 (1900) (“Statements made in committee
reports and floor statements by sponsors or floor managers of legislation presumably
represent the legislature’s views on specific issues.”).
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might serve; and (5) choosing among several possible “reasonable
purposes” for language in a politically controversial law.74

Conversely, those against granting legislative history authoritative weight rely on three core arguments. The first rests on the notion that no single unified intent can be attributed to the large, multimember Congress.75 Thus, legislative history is not indicative of
what Congress, as a whole, intended. The second critique argues that
judicial reliance on legislative history violates the Constitution, specifically the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause.76 Opponents contend that giving interpretive weight to legislative history treats it as
law and therefore violates the Constitution because it has been neither passed through both houses of Congress nor presented for presidential approval.77 Lastly, some argue these sources allow legislators
to exert manipulation over the courts. Particularly, “once legislators
learn that the Court will use legislative history in interpretation,
they have a great incentive to introduce comments into the record to
produce desired interpretive outcomes.”78
Opposition to legislative history has not been solely limited to the
scholarly realm. In fact, many judges have actively voiced their feelings against the practice. Distinctively, Justice Scalia is known as an
adamant opponent to judicial reliance on legislative history. An advocate of what is commonly referred to as new textualism, Scalia defends the traditional practice of staying within the confines of the
statutory text when discerning its meaning.79 Scalia has openly
shared his views with fellow members of the Court in countless opinions,80 but his criticism of the practice has had only minor implications on the judicial use of legislative history. Federal courts, includ-


74. Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REV. 845, 861 (1992).
75. Muriel Morisey Spence, The Sleeping Giant: Textualism as Power Struggle, 67 S.
CAL. L. REV. 585, 592 (1994); see also Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 73, at 327
(“Committee members and bill sponsors are not necessarily representative of the entire
Congress, and so it is not necessarily accurate to attribute their statements to the whole
body.”).
76. Eskridge & Frickey, supra note 73, at 327. The Bicameralism and Presentment
Clause is located in article 1, section 7, clause 2 of the United States Constitution. It states
that “[e]very Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate,
shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States.” U.S.
CONST. art. 1, § 7, cl. 2.
77. Koby, supra note 71, at 377.
78. John F. Manning, Textualism as a Nondelegation Doctrine, 97 COLUM. L. REV. 673,
732 (1997).
79. See Spence, supra note 75, at 586, 587.
80. See e.g., Bank One Chi., N.A. v. Midwest Bank & Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 280
(1996) (Scalia, J., concurring) (noting that “[l]egislative history that does not represent the
intent of the whole Congress is nonprobative; and legislative history that does represent
the intent of the whole Congress is fanciful”); Conroy v. Aniskoff, 507 U.S. 511, 519 (1993)
(Scalia, J., concurring) (“The greatest defect of legislative history is its illegitimacy. We are
governed by laws, not by the intentions of legislators.”).
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ing the United States Supreme Court, continue to rely on these interpretive sources as some judges are “too committed to reconstructing legislative intent . . . to abandon examining legislative history.”81
2. The Hierarchy of Legislative History
Putting the validity of legislative history aside, selecting which
type of legislative document to rely on adds another level to the debate. Within the traditional forms of legislative history, courts have
developed an implicit hierarchy, assigning differing degrees of significance to the various sources.82 Consistently favoring some forms of
legislative history over others, courts typically turn to “such materials for ‘decisive’ or ‘authoritative’ evidence of congressional intent.”83 Thus, the amount of deference assigned generally depends on
the speaker’s involvement in drafting legislation and how available
the speaker’s views are to the congressional membership.84
Committee reports and sponsor statements claim the top position
in the hierarchy.85 They are regarded as the most reliable forms of
legislative history because they embody “the considered and collective understanding of those Congressmen involved in drafting and
studying proposed legislation.”86 Additionally, other members of Congress are likely to acquiesce to a sponsor’s understanding of a bill because the sponsor is presumed to possess considerable knowledge regarding the legislation.87 The remaining legislative sources encompassed in the hierarchy are regarded as substantially less reliable.88
These materials distort the legislative record because they fail to sufficiently reflect the views of the enacting Congress.89 For example,
courts seldom rely on statements issued by opponents of legislation
because the opponents have “every incentive to misstate the
bill’s effect.”90
At the bottom of the hierarchy sit nonlegislator statements followed by subsequent legislative history, or post-enactment statements.91 It may seem unusual that people outside of Congress produce documents that comprise legislative history, but the realities of


81. Popkin, supra note 33, at 699.
82. Costello, supra note 68, at 41; see also William N. Eskridge, Jr., The New
Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621, 626 (1990) (discussing how courts may “consider certain
evidence to be more significant than other evidence”).
83. Manning, supra note 78, at 680.
84. Cross, supra note 26, at 222.
85. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 302-03.
86. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 637 (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Zuber
v. Allen, 396 U.S. 168, 186 (1969)).
87. Id. at 638.
88. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 304.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. See id. at 307.
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today’s law-making process sometimes require nonlegislators to draft
statutes. Typical nonlegislators include lobbyists, private interest
groups, other private organizations, and legislative study commissions.92 However, courts will only defer to nonlegislator statements if
they offer further support to a decision reached through alternative,
more reliable materials.93 Arguably, these statements lack sufficient
reliability because they fail to reflect the views of the enacting legislature.94 Furthermore, there is an incentive for misrepresentation.
Some claim that nonlegislator statements try to “smuggle private
deals into public law through the back door.”95 Despite these problems, courts consider them to possess some interpretive significance,
though they rely on them with caution.96 Acknowledging that statutes frequently “reflect carefully crafted compromises among the
various groups,”97 such statements and commentaries may provide
interpreting courts with a meaningful source of explanation.98
Subsequent legislative history, on the other hand, consists of
statements made after the statute has been enacted. Courts often
avoid reliance on post-enactment materials for several reasons. Notably, they are usually too vague to clarify an ambiguous statute.99
Some scholars also argue that they do not represent the intent of the
enacting legislators, making them unreliable.100 Additionally, the fact
that such statements are offered into the legislative record after the
bill is enacted deprives the Legislative and Executive Branch of the
opportunity to comment on or amend the record. This procedural
lapse invites “insincerity”101 and often leads to comments in the
record that are only indicative of a single legislator’s opinion.
Nevertheless, courts have not completely abandoned subsequent
legislative history.102 The general standard of judicial deference is to
invoke the statements when the exact congressional intent is incomprehensible;103 however, courts have relied on them in other limited
situations. For example, in Montana Wilderness Association v. United


92. See id. at 305; Eskridge, supra note 82, at 633.
93. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 640.
94. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 305.
95. Id.
96. See id. (discussing the case of Kosak v. United States, 465 U.S. 848 (1984), when
the Court relied on nonlegislator statements for interpretive guidance).
97. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 633-34.
98. See id. at 634.
99. Id. at 640.
100. Patricia M. Wald, Some Observations on the Use of Legislative History in the 1981
Supreme Court Term, 68 IOWA L. REV. 195, 205 (1983).
101. ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 306.
102. See id. (discussing the case of Montana Wilderness Ass’n v. United States Forest
Serv., 655 F.2d 951 (9th Cir. 1981) as an example of judicial reliance on post-enactment
sources).
103. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 640 (citing Seatrain Shipbuilding Corp. v. Shell Oil
Co., 444 U.S. 572, 596 (1980)).
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States Forest Service, the court assigned a subsequently issued conference report “significant weight . . . where it [was] clear that the conferees had carefully considered the issue.”104 Subsequent legislative history can provide context by shedding light on current societal norms
and is capable of imparting understanding of congressional intent.105
This Note barely skims the surface of the ongoing debate over the
proper application of legislative history. However, the argument
made in subsequent parts of this Note depends on the assumption
that legislative history is a helpful source of statutory interpretation.
Following that assumption, traditional forms of legislative history
can serve as a guide in answering the question of whether presidential signing statements could be defined as a new form of legislative
history with interpretive worth.
B. Introduction to the Modern Presidential Signing Statement
Debate
While opinions differ as to the interpretive value of presidential
signing statements, scholarship tends to favor rejecting this executive tool as an authoritative guide in statutory construction.106 Some
of the critiques are similar to those employed by opponents of legislative history. For example, critics suggest judicial reliance on signing
statements violates the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause.107
Assigning them interpretive weight arguably treats them as law.
This offends the constitutionally mandated requirements of enacting
legislation because the statements have not been reviewed by both
houses of Congress.108 However, courts acknowledge that signing
statements are not equivalent to binding law. They recognize the
statements only serve an assistive role in the overall interpretive
process, much like other extrinsic sources used to interpret statutes.
Presidential statements of interpretation are no more law than are
dictionaries or treatises, and courts are not bound to accept them as
authoritative. Signing statements are commonly used to “provid[e]


104. 655 F.2d 951, 957 (9th Cir. 1981).
105. See Daniel A. Farber & Philip P. Frickey, Legislative Intent and Public Choice, 74
VA. L. REV. 423, 467-68 (1988).
106. See Waites, supra note 46, at 761 (citing arguments for the complete cessation of
publication of signing statements); see also Garber & Wimmer, supra note 12, at 363
(arguing that courts should not refer to presidential signing statements).
107. Bradley & Posner, supra note 65, at 344 (stating that judicial reliance on
presidential signing statements will “allow the [P]resident to legislate without following
the process for legislation set forth in Article I of the Constitution.”).
108. Id.; see also Chad Thompson, Presidential Signing Statements: The Big Impact of
a Little Known Presidential Tool, 39 U. TOL. L. REV. 185, 204 (2007); see also Bradley &
Posner, supra note 65, at 344 (stating that judicial reliance on presidential signing
statements will “allow the president to legislate without following the process for
legislation set forth in Article I of the Constitution”).
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context and a basis of understanding the duly enacted law in question.”109 Contextual considerations do not violate the Constitution.
Critics also contend that signing statements intrude on the judiciary’s ultimate responsibility to “say what the law is.”110 The statements may hinder the court’s ability to make impartial decisions or,
alternatively, direct the court’s decision to an outcome the President
desires.111 Presidential appointment of judges exacerbates the problem even further. If the judges were appointed by the President who
issued the signing statement, they may feel a sense of loyalty and
obligation to apply the President’s interpretation.112 Submission to
presidential influence may discredit the judiciary’s role as an independent body, making the courts nothing more than “a mouthpiece of
presidential policy.”113
However, this argument places little faith in the judicial system.
The judiciary is no doubt competent enough to determine if the President is overstepping his authority. Courts can sensibly determine
how much deference the signing statement should receive.114 Moreover, from the perspective of the courts, employing signing statements
in this circumstance is no different than using other legislative
statements of intent which do not considerably infringe on the judiciary’s role to interpret the law.115 The President’s statements do not
encroach on judicial power so long as courts have the final say in
matters of interpretation.116
C. Signing Statements as a New Form of Legislative History
Apart from the aforementioned debate, two additional critiques
provide a basis for classifying signing statements as a new form of
legislative history. Many caution against the statements because (1)
the President is not a legislator and (2) the statements are issued after the bill is enacted.117 Yet, these characteristics resemble qualities
found in other legislative materials to which courts give minimal deference—specifically, subsequent legislative history and nonlegislator
statements. Thus, presidential statements of interpretation should be


109. Thompson, supra note 108, at 205.
110. See Cross, supra note 26, at 228 & n.113 (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137,
177 (1803)).
111. Id. at 228.
112. See Waites, supra note 46, at 775 (noting President Reagan’s “potential influence
on the judiciary” as he “appointed over 300 of the 761-member judiciary” within his
first term).
113. Id. at 777.
114. See Cross, supra note 26, at 220.
115. Id. at 213 n.27.
116. Id.
117. See, e.g. Popkin, supra note 33, at 709; Note, Context-Sensitive Deference, supra
note 10, at 607; ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 306.
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placed alongside those sources in the legislative history hierarchy,
receiving interpretive credence equivalent to their legislative history
counterparts. Ultimately, courts should look to signing statements if
they further support a decision reached with the assistance of other
interpretive tools or if the intent of the enacting coalition is overwhelmingly unclear. However, signing statements must meet some
contingencies before judges can place appropriate reliance on them
when interpreting statutes.
1. The President as a Nonlegislator
The notion that the President is not a member of Congress is, of
course, a truism. Indeed, the President may be characterized as the
quintessential nonlegislator.118 Accordingly, many are hesitant to extend the definition of legislative history because the President’s nonlegislator status forbids him from producing legislative materials.119
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals adhered to this justification in
Estate of Reynolds v. Martin when it wholly ignored a presidential
signing statement.120 The court explained that “[i]t is not the President’s place to write federal statutes.”121 Instead, the Constitution
clearly vests the power to make law in the Legislative Branch and
bestows limited legislative responsibilities to the President. According to Professor William Popkin, the Constitution restricts the President’s legislative actions to approving or vetoing bills, executing laws
under Article II, and proposing statutes.122 Professor Popkin argues
that utilizing signing statements for statutory interpretation exceeds
these constitutionally proscribed roles.123 Others argue that signing
statements fail as effective forms of legislative history because
statements from nonlegislators, such as the President, are “unreliable indicators of Congress’[s] will.”124
Nonetheless, these arguments do not justify excluding signing
statements as a new breed of legislative history. The President is not
a legislator, but as previously discussed, interpreting courts have
looked to other nonlegislator statements for context in statutory construction cases.125 Still, in order to receive judicial deference, courts
require that nonlegislators be closely involved in the law-making


118. See ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 306.
119. See Popkin, supra note 33, at 709; see also Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and
Statutory Interpretation in the Bush Administration, 16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 307, 309
(2007) (noting that “the President is not part of the legislature”).
120. 985 F.2d 470, 477 n.8 (1993).
121. Id.
122. Popkin, supra note 33, at 709-13.
123. See id. at 709-10.
124. See Garber & Wimmer, supra note 12, at 381.
125. Eskridge, supra note 82, at 633-34; see also supra notes 91-98 and accompanying
text.
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process.126 Thus, the President’s understanding of a statute should be
given some interpretive weight if he proposed or initiated legislation,
or was involved in other steps during the course of the enactment.
Courts should not ignore the practicalities of today’s political
process. Judges need to recognize the President is often a pervasive
force in enacting legislation. Presidents have been involved with
creating bills since George Washington.127 President Jefferson was
also known to occasionally “draft[] bills and control[] their progress
through Congress.”128 Additionally, an early Supreme Court decision
accepted the President’s ability to influence legislation. In an 1899
case, the Court observed that “the approval by the President of a bill
passed by Congress is not strictly an executive function, but is legislative in nature.”129 Currently, it is exceedingly common for Presidents to “work[] closely with Congress to craft a bill and orchestrate
its passage.”130 To offer a practical example, President Obama recently proposed the hotly debated health care reform bill. In March of
2010, the bill was passed and signed into law.131 If President Obama
had concurrently issued a statement with the legislation, courts
should have acknowledged the statement’s interpretive value because
of Obama’s intimate involvement and special knowledge of the bill.
The President is able to influence legislation through his veto
power.132 Once a bill is presented to the President, if he declines to
sign it into law, he may send the bill back to Congress with his objections.133 In order to obtain presidential approval, Congress would
need to reform the bill to meet presidential desires.134 Moreover, the
mere threat of a presidential veto significantly affects the way Congress shapes legislation.135 For example, during the Nixon Administration, Congress “cleaned up” approximately thirty bills because of
the looming threat of a potential veto.136 The law-making process is
time-consuming and expensive. In most instances, members of Congress, particularly those within the enacting coalition, have spent


126. See Eskridge, supra note 82, at 633 (stating that “[o]ccasionally, law professors’
testimony is important evidence, especially if they originated or drafted the legislation”).
127. Kinkopf, supra note 119, at 309; see also Cross, supra note 26, at 214-15.
128. Cross, supra note 26, at 215.
129. La Abra Silver Mining Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 423, 453 (1899).
130. Note, Context-Sensitive Deference, supra note 10, at 605.
131. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, H.R. 3590, 111th Cong. (2010).
132. See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 119, 121 (1975) (“The President is a participant in
the law-making process by virtue of his authority to veto bills enacted by Congress.”).
133. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
134. See id.
135. Cross, supra note 26, at 216; see also Kathryn Marie Dessayer, The First Word:
The President’s Place in “Legislative History”, 89 MICH. L. REV. 399, 411 (1990) (“The
constitutional requirement of presentment forces legislators to bear in mind the President’s
views on potential legislation in order to avoid a veto.”).
136. Cross, supra note 26, at 216 (quoting STEPHEN J. WAYNE, THE LEGISLATIVE
PRESIDENCY 159 (1978)).
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extensive hours initiating a bill, drafting the statutory language, debating its merits, and carrying it to the point of presentment to the
President. While Congress has the power to override a presidential
veto, it would prefer to avoid a veto completely.137 Thus, the proposed
bill will normally “reflect the [P]resident’s preference.”138
The Constitution embraces the President’s significant presence in
the law-making process. The same constitutional provisions that Professor Popkin argues constrain the President in fact support the concept that the President plays a pivotal part in creating the law.139
Under the scope of the Bicameralism and Presentment Clause, Congress cannot successfully enact legislation without presidential approval.140 This constitutional requirement makes the President and
Congress partners in the legislative process.141 Thus, the President’s
understanding of a statute should be given weight in a similar manner as Congress’s.142 The President also obtains legislative influence
from his Article II powers to recommend to Congress “such
[m]easures as he shall judge necessary and expedient” and to “take
[c]are that the [l]aws be faithfully executed.”143 Proposing legislation
places the President within the enacting coalition.144 If the President
proposes a bill, he presumably has special understanding of the legislation that should be acknowledged by an interpreting court.145 Additionally, faithful execution of the law requires some interpretive power. After all, the President must ascertain the meaning of the law to
know how to properly execute that law.146
Given that signing statements encompass the President’s understanding of legislation, some opponents claim the statements lack the
congressional intent that courts generally seek when interpreting
statutes.147 Likewise, others also claim that the President’s views are
irrelevant since he only possesses the ability to accept or reject the


137. See Dessayer, supra note 135, at 410-11.
138. Bradley & Posner, supra note 65, at 350.
139. See Mark R. Killenbeck, A Matter of Mere Approval? The Role of the President in
the Creation of Legislative History, 48 ARK. L. REV. 239, 286 (1995) (arguing that the
President has a constitutionally-provided role in legislation through his obligation to
recommend legislation, the Presentment Clause, veto power, “and the duty to take care
that the laws be faithfully executed”); see also Waites, supra note 46, at 768-70.
140. See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2.
141. Bradley & Posner, supra note 65, at 346.
142. See Carroll, supra note 7, at 515.
143. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
144. Bradley & Posner, supra note 65, at 351.
145. The Use of Presidential Signing Statements: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the
Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006) (statement of Nicholas Quinn Rosenkranz, Associate
Professor
of
Law,
Georgetown
University
Law
Center),
available
at
http://judiciary.senate.gov/hearings/testimony.cfm?id=1969&wit_id=5483.
146. See id.
147. See Garber & Wimmer, supra note 12, at 392 (arguing that signing statements
“lack the characteristics necessary to constitute a reliable source of information as to the
will of the Legislature”).
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statute.148 But, as previously discussed, it is not uncommon for a
President to propose or draft his own legislation. Nevertheless, to
successfully effectuate legislative intent, courts should be wary in
giving deference to presidential signing statements unless the statements themselves “give effect to congressional intent.”149 Ideally,
courts should apply a method similar to the one employed by Justice
Stevens in his dissent in Kosak v. United States.150 When questioning
the function of traditional nonlegislator statements, Justice Stevens
suggested that nonlegislator intent should not be ascribed to Congress unless there is “positive evidence that elected legislators were
aware of and shared the [nonlegislator’s] intent.”151 Such reciprocal
understanding makes signing statements more reliable.152 If a signing statement includes “congressional testimony . . . before Congress,” or if the interpretation was presented during congressional
debates, the President’s interpretation of the statute will contain
some “indicia of reliability.”153 However, this can only be achieved if
the Executive and Legislative Branches truly act as partners in the
law-making process.
When discerning legislative intent, it is also important to consider
the President’s ability to control the information on which legislators
rely to form their decisions.154 Specifically, Presidents help “set the
agenda for congressional debate, . . . develop[] proposals from inside
and outside the [E]xecutive [B]ranch, . . . [and] monitor[] congressional deliberations and influence[] congressional judgments.”155
Presidential influence over legislative procedure establishes the possibility that signing statements may reflect legislative intent.156
Recognizing the practicalities of the President’s legislative involvement often invokes claims concerning the separation of powers
doctrine. Allowing the head of the Executive Branch to cross over
constitutionally established lines of separation not only encroaches
on the “duty of the [l]egislature to make law,” but also leads to the
aggrandizement of the President’s power.157 According to those who
believe one branch of government should not exercise the powers of


148. See, e.g., Jonathan R. Siegel, The Use of Legislative History in a System of
Separated Powers, 53 VAND. L. REV. 1457, 1526 (2000).
149. Carroll, supra note 7, at 518.
150. 465 U.S. 848, 862-69 (1983) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
151. Id. at 863.
152. Carroll, supra note 7, at 518-19.
153. Kinkopf, supra note 119, at 310.
154. Id. at 307.
155. Cross, supra note 26, at 217 (quoting STEPHEN J. WAYNE, THE LEGISLATIVE
PRESIDENCY 20-21 (1978)).
156. Kinkopf, supra note 119, at 307.
157. Garber & Wimmer, supra note 12, at 383, 394.

198

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:179

another, judicial reliance on signing statements is an “unconstitutional exercise of authority” that violates the separation of powers.158
Courts traditionally viewed the government branches as strictly
separated from one another, hindering the President’s ability to traverse into the legislative realm.159 Presently, courts are using a “functionalist model” whereby the lines previously drawn between the
branches are now somewhat blurred.160 The Supreme Court has come
to embrace this approach. In a 1976 case, the Court condemned strict
separation because the “hermetic sealing off of the three branches of
Government from one another would preclude the establishment of a
Nation capable of governing itself effectively.”161 The separation of
powers doctrine no longer requires the complete seclusion of the individual branches,162 laying to rest what was formerly viewed as constitutional restraints on the President’s ability to create legislation.
Based on the President’s vast role in the legislative process, courts
should not be dissuaded from characterizing signing statements as a
new form of legislative history. The President’s status as a nonlegislator is an insufficient basis to ignore the interpretive worth these
statements possess. However, this does not mean every statement
the President signs upon enacting a bill should be deemed legislative
history. Courts must be circumspect in extending the definition and
should only consider signing statements that are accompanied by
considerable evidence that the President was a “critical partner”163 in
enacting the law. Moreover, the legislation proposed or modified by
the President must not have been extensively altered by Congress.164
Admittedly, requiring judges to determine presidential participation with a particular piece of legislation would be an extremely difficult task. The courts will not always know whether the statute they
seek to interpret is a result of the President’s volition. A President’s
role may not be as publicized as President Obama’s was with the recent heath-care-reform bill.165 However, to avoid abuse of this execu-


158. See id. at 372-73.
159. See Carroll, supra note 7, at 479 (discussing the “formalistic” approach
traditionally used by the Supreme Court”).
160. See id at 479-80.
161. Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 119, 121 (1976); see also Myers v. United States, 272
U.S. 52, 291 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The separation of the powers of government
did not make each branch completely autonomous. It left . . . to each power to exercise, in
some respects, functions in their nature executive, legislative and judicial.”).
162. Cross, supra note 26, at 213.
163. Id. at 218-19.
164. Killenbeck, supra note 139, at 276.
165. See, e.g., David. M. Herszenhorn & Robert Pear, Obama to Offer Health Bill to
Ease Impasse as Bipartisan Meeting Approaches, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 18, 2010),
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/02/19/health/policy/19health.html; Sheryl Gay Stolberg &
Robert Pear, Obama Signs Health Care Overhaul Bill, With a Flourish, N.Y. TIMES (Mar.
23, 2010), http://www.nytimes.com/2010/03/24/health/policy/24health.html.
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tive tool, it is important that courts require a showing of presidential
involvement before deferring to signing statements. Thus, courts
should not presume legislative involvement. Instead, courts should
institute a sort of evidentiary standard: if information about the
President’s role in drafting legislation is not easily ascertainable by
the judges, the proponent who wishes the court to rely on the signing
statement should bear the responsibility of showing that the President was involved in the law-making process. The proponent can
meet this burden by offering evidence that the President drafted the
legislation, personally proposed the legislation, or worked closely
with members of Congress throughout the course of enactment.
2. Presidential Signing Statements as Subsequent Legislative
History
The interpretive worth of signing statements can also be evaluated by comparing them to subsequent legislative history. Signing
statements are similar to these traditional legislative sources because the President issues his interpretations after the bill is passed
by Congress.166 This characteristic, many argue, makes the statements unreliable because they deprive Congress of the opportunity to
comment on the President’s remarks.167 In contrast, legislative history regarded as especially authoritative, such as committee reports or
sponsor statements, reflects a compromise resulting from congressional process that allows “each chamber to ratify or respond to . . .
legislative history.”168 Signing statements are considered problematic
because they lack indications of congressional deliberations and of
dialogue between the President and Congress.169
Some argue that signing statements, like their legislative history
counterparts, create an opportunity for manipulation.170 The temporal
characteristic of signing statements precludes Congress from responding to the President’s statement.171 This may incentivize the President
to issue interpretations that would oppose congressional intent and
alter the meaning of the bill into something that Congress would have
rejected.172 Assumedly, the President may try to shape legislative history in hopes of achieving a “desired interpretive outcome[].”173
This theory, however, reaches beyond assumptions and extends to
reality. Some of President Reagan’s signing statements took con-


166.
167.
168.
169.
170.
171.
172.
173.

See Note, Context-Sensitive Deference, supra note 10, at 607.
Id.
Id.
See id.
ESKRIDGE, JR. ET AL., supra note 4, at 306.
Kinkopf, supra note 119, at 310.
Cross, supra note 26, at 223.
Manning, supra note 78, at 732.
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tested political positions in controversial debates.174 President George
H.W. Bush was also accused of exercising manipulative behavior
through signing statements.175 In 1992, a case was brought before the
United States District Court in Massachusetts to determine whether
the Civil Rights Act of 1991 applied retroactively.176 The legislative
history surrounding the Act was deemed ambiguous.177 However,
President Bush’s signing statement declared his understanding that
the Act did not expressly apply retroactively but provided some exemptions, a stance that contradicted other forms of legislative history.178 Acknowledging the potential for manipulation, the court rejected the President’s understanding by noting that there was “no
reason to treat this judgment as anything other than a similar
statement of intent that was unable to be stated explicitly in the legislation.”179
Yet, problems of presidential “post-enactment opportunism” can
be easily “constrained by [the] courts.”180 Judges can evaluate the
credibility of the signing statements presented to them and determine their true interpretive value. Still, reliance on presidential
statements of interpretation should be predicated on their consistency with other legislative materials and presidential pronouncements.181 By examining presidential signing statements alongside
more reliable forms of legislative history, the courts can square the
President’s understanding with Congress’s, eliminating the ability
for the President to slip in statements that contradict the outcome of
congressional deliberations. Additionally, by constraining reliance on
signing statements, the “incentives to introduce comments in the
record solely to influence future interpretations”182 decreases significantly. Under the proposed rubric, the President’s statements should
be discredited if they do not support an interpretation reached by
other sources considered to be indicative of congressional intent. This
eliminates the President’s ability to influence the judiciary’s decisions regarding statutory construction.
Deferring to signing statements for interpretive guidance will not
deviate from the Supreme Court’s opinion on subsequent legislative
history. In 1980, the Court declared its aversion for judicial reliance


174. Popkin, supra note 33, at 714.
175. Miranda Lee, Comment, Reorienting the Debate on Presidential Signing
Statements: The Need for Transparency in the President’s Constitutional Objections,
Reservations and Assertions of Power, 55 UCLA L. REV. 705, 706 n.1 (2008).
176. Petitti v. New England Tel. & Tel. Co., No. 89-3951, 1992 WL 359643, at *1 (Nov.
16, 1992).
177. Id. at *4.
178. See id. at *2.
179. Id. at *4.
180. Bradley & Posner, supra note 65, at 355.
181. Id. at 355.
182. See Note, Learned Hand, supra note 3, at 1017.
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on post-enactment statements, “asserting that ‘even when it would
otherwise be useful, subsequent legislative history will rarely override a reasonable interpretation of a statute that can be gleaned from
its language and legislative history prior to its enactment.’ ”183 Signing statements should never act to override an interpretation reached
through more reliable legislative sources. Instead, they should only
provide context to the overall interpretation.
Additionally, ignoring the interpretive value of signing statements
because of their temporal characteristic is inconsistent with the current practices of administrative law. In two significant cases, Chevron v. NRDC, Inc. and Skidmore v. Swift & Co., the United States
Supreme Court recognized the permissible practice of delegating interpretive authority to agency opinions.184 Under this doctrine, courts
frequently rely on the interpretations of Executive Branch agencies
even though they were issued after the statute’s enactment.185 Courts
are comfortable providing deference to post-enactment agency interpretations because of the control the Executive Branch has over the
individual agencies. As Chevron notes, “agencies are not directly accountable to the people,” but the President is.186 For those who adhere to this model of presidential control, it may serve as an analogue
of judicial deference to post-enactment presidential statements. Arguably, it should not make a difference whether post-enactment interpretations of a statute come from an agency or from presidential
signing statements.187 Deferring directly to the President eliminates
the middle step and provides some transparency in the political
process.188 Essentially, as those that follow this theory argue, “banning reliance on signing statements . . . would only redirect the interpretive process toward the agency without significantly reducing
the President’s ability to influence the ways statutes are interpreted.”189 Thus, the post-enactment characteristic of signing statements does not preclude judicial reliance.
One may argue that the practicalities of our government suggest
that signing statements are even more reliable and less problematic
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than post-enactment and nonlegislator statements. The President is
often more involved in the legislative process than most interest
groups and private organizations. Additionally, while the role of congressional members ceases once a bill is signed into law, the President’s involvement continues through the subsequent administration
and enforcement of the bill.190 The incentive to insert opposing views
is also greater with legislators than with the President. Because the
President is often a pervasive force in the legislative process, he has an
incentive to issue statements that truthfully represent the legislative
compromise.191 Failure to do so could not only lead to cynicism from
citizens and other political actors, but could also make it difficult to
work harmoniously with Congress when enacting future legislation.192
The President is a more visible character than the congressional membership and, therefore, has more cause to protect his credibility.193
Nevertheless, these practicalities do not justify assigning presidential statements more interpretive weight than their legislative
history counterparts. It is unlikely that every citizen is able to name
all the Senators or Representatives in Congress; however, legislators
are visible characters within the communities they are charged to
represent. Accordingly, members of Congress may be equally concerned with their credibility and the image they convey to the public,
especially if running for reelection. Legislators are also concerned
about the reputation they may develop within the political community. If other members of Congress or the President take offense to a
legislator’s character or actions, it is presumed they would be less
willing to support legislation proposed by that individual. Therefore,
the judicial treatment that presidential signing statements should
receive is minimal deference equivalent to nonlegislator and postenactment statements.
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF JUDICIAL DEFERENCE TO PRESIDENTIAL
SIGNING STATEMENTS
Limiting the function of interpretive signing statements to nothing more than contextual aids will eliminate many of the problems
associated with their use. However, applying this minimal standard
of deference may impact the realm of statutory interpretation in several ways. The proposed standard of deference is likely to not only
affect political actors in the law-making process but also judges
themselves.
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A. Practical Implications
Although the proper application of signing statements has not
been ultimately decided, several federal courts adhere to the proposed standard of deference, citing to signing statements when they
support assertions found in more reliable forms of legislative history.
For example, the court in Burrus v. Vegliante was tasked with interpreting the Hatch Act, a statute that prohibits federal workers from
engaging in on-the-job political activity.194 The court looked to legislative materials to determine what forms of political activity were prohibited by the Act. The senate report stated a recent amendment to
the Act expanded the current law to allow voluntary political activity
by federal civilian and postal workers as long as the employees are
off the clock.195 While the senate report alone supported the ultimate
conclusion, the court turned to President Clinton’s signing statement
for further support. Deferring to the President’s statement was appropriate because it endorsed the views held by the senate report explaining that employees can “volunteer on their own time for the
candidate of their choice.”196
Other courts have relied on signing statements when they provide
collateral support to additional legislative materials. In Duffield v.
Robertson Stephens & Co., the Ninth Circuit rationalized its citation
to a signing statement on the grounds that it “echoed Congress’[s]
understanding” of the act subject to interpretation.197 Similarly, in a
more recent Ninth Circuit case, the court cited to both the House Report and President Clinton’s signing statement to determine the purpose and goal of a statute.198 Thus, the proposed standard will not
significantly alter the current approach courts follow when relying on
presidential signing statements.
An interesting issue arises, however, when traditional forms of
legislative history are themselves conflicting. What help can presidential signing statements provide in such a situation? One federal
court addressed this issue. In United States v. Story, the court was to
decide whether the Sentencing Reform Act of 1984 applied to “straddle crimes,” crimes that began before the Act was effective and continued after the effective date.199 Determining that the statutory language was ambiguous, the court turned to sponsor statements from
both the House and the Senate.200 The House manager of the bill ex-
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plained in a footnote that the Act “would not apply to an offense begun before” the effective date.201 However, the Senate sponsor’s
statement directly opposed that interpretation and argued that the
sentencing guidelines applied to continuing offenses.202 With these
legislative materials in contention, the court relied on a statement
issued by President Reagan that agreed with the Senate.203 Although
the signing statement conflicted with the House’s understanding, the
court correctly determined the statement possessed interpretive
weight because the Executive Branch actively participated in the
enactment of the Sentencing Reform Act.204
Story illustrates how courts should consider the realities of the
legislative process. While noting the President’s involvement with
the Act, the court appropriately relied on the President’s statement.
Specifically, the court looked at President Reagan’s statement as part
of the overall context in the interpretive process. Apart from the signing statement, the court in Story acknowledged that the decision was
in line with previous cases and the conclusion reached “advance[d
the] basic congressional purpose underlying the Guidelines system—
to lessen disparity in sentencing.”205 Thus, using the President’s signing statement to clarify the application of the Act conformed to the
proposed minimal level of deference.
B. Institutional Implications
Applying a minimal deferential standard to presidential signing
statements may have significant institutional implications. Specifically, it may affect the interpretive methods used by individual
judges. A textualist judge may be more inclined to rely on presidential signing statements than on traditional forms of legislative history. Textualists frequently dismiss legislative history as an authoritative basis for statutory interpretation.206 They claim legislative history does not properly represent the collective intent of Congress because committee reports and sponsor statements only embody the
opinions of a small portion of the congressional membership.207 However, minimal judicial reliance on presidential signing statements
avoids some of the problems textualists associate with traditional
legislative history.
If the President partners with Congress to draft a bill, and if Congress does not substantially alter the President’s views, it is likely
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that both Houses of Congress agree or at least acknowledge the President’s opinion on the matter. Further, if the President works with
the bill from its inception, Congress is likely aware of the President’s
interpretation. Moreover, Congress has the opportunity to oppose the
President’s views before the statute is enacted. Signing statements
also eliminate the problem of collective intent because the President
is one person, as opposed to the 535 congressional members, so his
statements fully embody a unitary understanding.
The decisions of Justice Scalia, a widely known textualist, shed
some light on this concept. Scalia is known as the most “acerbic critic
of legislative history”208 and is a passionate proponent for the textualist ideals.209 However, like most textualists, Scalia has not shied
away from other extrinsic sources such as treatises and dictionaries.210 It is possible that presidential signing statements may be one
of those extrinsic sources to which textualists may now turn. Before
his appointment to the Supreme Court, Scalia relied on an executive
signing statement in a 1985 case that came before the District of Columbia Circuit Court of Appeals.211 Scalia acknowledged the interpretive worth of signing statements again in the 2006 case Hamdan v.
Rumsfeld where he criticized the majority opinion for ignoring the
President’s signing statement when interpreting the Detainee
Treatment Act.212 Although opposed to the general use of legislative
history, Scalia seems to recognize the importance of the President in
the legislative process. His dissent in Hamdan suggested “there is no
legal difference between the views of Congress and the [P]resident
about what a law means.”213
A recent textualist critique against the use of legislative history has
surfaced in the form of a delegation argument. Professor Manning argues that courts should not consider committee reports or sponsor
statements as representative of congressional intent because doing so
results in legislative self-delegation, which is a constitutionally prohibited practice.214 Legislative self-delegation occurs when a court grants
interpretive weight to legislative history. This effectively permits
committee reports or sponsor statements to provide an interpretation
of the law on behalf of Congress.215 Manning contends that judicial re-
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liance on legislative history delegates the power to determine statutory
meaning to legislative agents, such as congressional staffers.216
Presidential signing statements may be seen as a form of delegation because judicial reliance assigns some interpretive power to the
Executive Branch. However, this differs drastically from the legislative self-delegation described by Manning. Delegation through signing statements is not offensive to the textualist ideals because the
Executive Branch is independent of Congress.217 The Constitution
imposes certain hurdles to enact a bill that are quite costly and burdensome, so it is not surprising that Congress attempts to delegate
its law-making authority.218 And, while delegating to the Executive
Branch is more costly than legislative self-delegation,219 it provides a
basis for textualists to rely on signing statements. As Manning notes,
“textualists tolerate executory delegation because it is preferable to
the alternative—unchanneled judicial application of an assertive
nondelegation doctrine.”220 Furthermore, if the President partnered
with Congress in creating the law, Congress would feel more comfortable relinquishing some of its authority to the Executive Branch.
While under the purview of the Constitution the President is distinct from the Legislative Branch, he is arguably the 536th member
of Congress because of his extensive involvement in the legislative
process. Thus, under textualist notions, the argument would follow
that deference to signing statements may violate the prohibition
against self-delegation. Specifically, judicial reliance on signing
statements allows Congress to assign law-making authority to
another member involved in drafting bills, the President. It is important to note the President’s involvement in legislation. However, under constitutional definitions, the President is not a member of Congress, but the leader of the Executive Branch. While the lines that
established the separation of powers are not as definitive as they
once were,221 they still maintain sufficient rigidity to avoid delegation
problems between the Legislative and Executive Branches. Moreover,
Professor Manning’s article explicitly applies to traditional forms of
legislation history and may not pertain to the implications of presidential signing statements. Nevertheless, even if the nondelegation
argument applies in this circumstance, textualists should not be concerned. If courts adhere to minimal deference, judicial decisions will
not be substantially altered. Ultimately, signing statements are help-
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ful within the overall context of statutory interpretation and should
not be ignored.
V. CONCLUSION
As one scholar appropriately states, “[w]hatever one’s views of
presidential power, the [P]resident has the right and perhaps even a
constitutional obligation to state his opinion about the meaning of a
statute.”222 It is time, however, for courts to affirmatively decide
these statements’ proper role in statutory interpretation. A decision
needs to be made so judges can comfortably apply a unified standard.
While one may be quick to dismiss these statements’ interpretive
worth, the contextual value they offer may outweigh their potential
problems. If courts acknowledge the realities of the political process,
the President’s interpretation of statutory text can offer guidance in
clarifying ambiguities. Providing minimal and contingent deference
will allow judges to confidently place presidential signing statements
in their interpretive toolbox, making it easier for the courts to fulfill
their duty to “say what the law is.”223
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